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Abstract 
Interest in politics is a key indicator of citizens’ attitudes toward politics. 
Scholars disagree whether interest is a stable trait developed during adolescence, 
or if it changes over the life-course. We hypothesize that deteriorating health can 
destabilize the stable sense of political interest because worsening health makes 
individuals more dependent on public healthcare and increase their attention to 
politics. Furthermore, we assume that the impact of health on interest is 
conditional on income as people with low incomes are dependent on public 
healthcare. Our results show only limited support for the first hypothesis. 
However, we found a negative relationship between declining health and 
increasing interest in the lowest income group. The results are consistent with 
the life-cycle theory, which presumes that important events in life have 
consequences even for the most endurable political attitudes. Deteriorating 
personal health can be a source of motivation to make persons more interested 
in politics. 
Keywords: political interest, health, self-interest theory, life-cycle theory, political socialization 
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Introduction 
Political interest is perhaps the most fundamental factor in determining citizens’ attitudes 
toward politics, and it is widely regarded as the key characteristic of a democratic citizen (Prior, 
2010; Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010). According to van Deth and Elff (2004: 478), interest in 
political affairs makes it possible for citizens to defend their preferences in the democratic 
process, and it therefore marks the most important difference between citizenship under 
democratic or authoritarian rule. Still, as Prior (2010) notes, many political scientists admit that 
they do not fully understand the true nature of political interest as an analytical construct. This 
is perhaps most clearly evident in the conflicting evidence concerning the stability of political 
interest over the human life course. Early studies by Jennings and Niemi (1974) and Jennings 
and Markus (1984) concluded that political interest varies over time, while more recent 
findings have disputed these results (for example, Prior, 2008, 2010; Shani, 2009). This 
disagreement is part of a much wider scholarly debate regarding the larger question whether 
political orientations are stable over an individual´s life course or if they change over time. 
 
Scholars have sought answers to this dilemma by examining two competing hypotheses. 
According to the lifelong openness hypothesis, people update their political attitudes over their 
life course, especially if personal experiences provide a reason for change. The lifelong 
persistence hypothesis instead proposes that attitudes, which have been formed early on in life, 
typically during adolescence or early adulthood, tend to remain stable throughout life. (See for 
example Lyons, 2016; Russo and Stattin, 2016; Sears, 1983). There is also a sort of middle-
ground position suggesting that interest is susceptible to change during the formative years of 
adolescence and early adulthood, after which it stabilizes (Neundorf et al., 2013). Political 
socialization provides an important theoretical framework for all of these explanations. 
Klemmensen et al. (2012) have, however, recently shown that accounting for genetic influence 
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considerably reduced the impact of the growth environment, thus casting some doubt over the 
ability of the socialization paradigm to explain political interest. Klemmensen et al. also 
speculate that political interest might instead be more a part of an individual’s psychological 
profile, rather than determined by the socialization experience quite as strongly as much of the 
previous scholarship has suggested. 
 
In this study, also we investigate the possibility that political interest may not be as irrevocably 
determined through the process of political socialization during adolescence and early 
adulthood. We examine the possibility that (in)stability could depend on motivational factors; 
if there is a significant enough reason for the individual to change their existing level of interest 
in politics, they might do so. Furthermore, we highlight the importance of context; motivational 
factors may be more significant for certain groups of people. For example, in this study we ask 
if motivational factors are more strongly related to interest in politics among people who are 
more likely to depend on services provided by the public health care sector. For political 
behaviour scholarship these issues are quite significant. If fundamental political attitudes, such 
as political interest, really are stable over a person’s life course, all effort should be directed 
towards understanding how they develop in the first place. But if they can and do change over 
time, we should instead look for contexts and situations where fluctuations occur also later in 
life. 
 
We look at changes in personal health by considering them as a life-cycle event that changes 
the stakes people have in politics, thus also changing the way people will express interest in 
politics. We use the British Household Panel Survey data to test the assumption that declining 
health leads people to become more interested in politics. Our first hypothesis assumes that 
when people become more dependent on the public sector for healthcare services due to 
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declining health, they also become more motivated to start paying more attention to politics. 
Our second hypothesis is an elaboration of the first one. It proposes that it is especially the less 
economically fortunate people whose levels of political interest are affected by their health 
condition, as they are in a more vulnerable position and hence more dependent on public 
services and transfers when their health deteriorates.  
 
Our empirical analysis suggests that the relationship between declining health and increasing 
interest is strongest among low-income people and weaker or non-existent among people with 
mid-range or high income. This is the first research to show this contingent effect of health on 
political interest which is interesting in the context of the United Kingdom where private health 
care arrangements often complement the relatively strong services offered by the National 
Health System (NHS). We interpret the findings to be consistent with the assumption that 
personal hardship may in fact increase interest in politics and therefore even have a mobilising 
impact on political behaviour. 
 
Political interest and self-interest 
The individual-level manifestations of political interest are familiar to all political scientists. 
Politically interested citizens are usually well-informed (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996) and 
participate eagerly in politics (Verba et al., 1997). They are also keen to continuously learn 
from the news media to keep up-to-date with daily politics (Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010). In 
line with these observations, political scientists have typically associated political interest with 
active citizenship. Subsequently, political interest has been defined as the degree to which 
politics arouses a citizen’s curiosity (van Deth, 1990: 275–278), the extent to which politics is 
attractive to someone (Dostie-Goulet, 2009: 406) or as a citizen’s willingness to pay attention 
to political phenomena at the possible expense of other topics (Lupia and Philbot, 2005: 1122). 
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According to these definitions interest is intrinsic and people turn to politics because of pure 
pleasure, enjoyment, and curiosity – simply because they find politics interesting in itself. 
While this is undoubtedly the case for many people, considering political interest to indicate 
curiosity about politics approaches a tautology. 
 
Turning to psychology might offer a way forward to a better understanding of what political 
interest is all about. In psychological terms, political interest signifies motivation, which not 
only describes interest as, for example, curiosity, but also seeks to understand how it comes 
about (see also Colombo, 2018; van Deth, 1990). In psychology, interest has been widely 
viewed as an emotion that is intimately tied to motivation (see also Robison, 2017; Silvia, 
2008). The most enduring principle in psychological theories of motivation is that interest – in 
anything – involves a calculus, whereby a person seeks to maximize gains and minimize losses 
(Birch and Veroff, 1968: 3). 
 
Political scientists recognize the same idea as the essence of self-interest theory. According to 
Sears and Funk (1990: 248), a basic psychological assumption in self-interest theory is the 
simple pain-pleasure principle of human motivation, that is, that the instinctive motivation in 
human action is the maximization of personal gain. In this study, we apply this idea to 
examining changes over time in political interest. We expect political interest levels to respond 
to changes in a person’s motivation level, which, in turn, we expect to change as a function of 
self-interest. Therefore, if a person thinks he/she has more to gain from paying more attention 
to politics, his/her self-reported political interest should increase as a result. 
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Hence, we offer a slightly alternative view of political interest as simply being a matter of just 
finding politics curious or enjoyable. We feel that explaining interest as arising from (an 
inexplicable) feeling of curiosity is certainly useful, but insufficient to clarify how political 
interest as an analytical construct should be understood. Our suggestion is that at least under 
some circumstances, an expression of political interest could be tied to self-interest 
considerations, which, especially in psychological literature, are commonly referred to simply 
as motivation. 
 
Theoretical expectations 
Although the self-interest approach has been widely used, according to conventional wisdom 
self-interest considerations only rarely guide the political actions of ordinary people (Lewis-
Beck et al., 2008: 197). It therefore seems that a sense of personal motivation is not a 
particularly strong predictor of political behaviour. However, Weeden and Kurzban (2017) 
have recently challenged this view by arguing that there is in fact a considerable number of 
studies that have found evidence strongly suggesting support for self-interest theory. While 
self-interest may in most analyses yield non-significant results, it nevertheless seems to predict 
behaviour in policy issues with substantial, imminent and obvious effects for the well-being of 
the individual (for example, Kinder, 1998: 802; see Weeden and Kurzban, 2017: 72 for a 
review). Healthcare, and social policy more broadly, are areas where self-interest seems to play 
a particularly salient role (Hacker et al., 2013; Margalit, 2013; Owens and Pedulla, 2014; 
Mattila and Rapeli, 2018). People who are concerned about medical costs also support more 
universal healthcare coverage (Henderson and Hillygus, 2011). As Soss (1999: 363) explains, 
welfare recipients have an unusually visible material stake in government policies. Their 
immediate fates depend on the actions of public officials, and this fact is routinely underscored 
by speeches delivered in electoral campaigns and legislative debates. 
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Moreover, for voting propensity, the impact of health is essentially on par with partisan 
strength, religious attendance, and newspaper readership (Pacheco and Fletcher, 2015: 109), 
and its magnitude is about 10 percentage points in comparison between people in poor versus 
excellent health when age and education are controlled for (Mattila et al., 2013). Also, Burden 
et al. (2017) noted that health has a powerful effect on voting in the US. The size of the health 
effect in their analysis was on par with traditional predictors of participation such as education. 
 
Therefore, plenty of evidence suggests that self-interest could be important in shaping political 
behaviour when personal health is at stake. This underscores the increasing appreciation among 
scholars that health affects all aspects of the human experience, including political attitudes 
(Papageorgiou et al., 2019) and political behaviour (for example, Pacheco and Fletcher, 2015; 
Stockemer and Rapp, 2019; Mattila, 2020). As such, a change in personal health potentially 
constitutes an important life event, which may have consequences for political interest, 
especially in the case of long-term health problems or other serious health conditions. 
According to life-cycle theory, individuals’ political behaviour responds to various life events, 
particularly to the transition from adolescence or early adulthood to adulthood. Getting an 
education, settling down and building a career and a family increase the stakes a person has in 
politics and society, thus also affecting their political behaviour (see for example, Neundorf et 
al., 2013: 96ff). Life-cycle events, such as entering the workforce, unemployment or family-
related matters, do not, however, seem to affect interest levels after the impressionable years 
in (late) adolescence (Neundorft et al., 2013), suggesting considerable stability in interest after 
reaching adulthood. 
 
By looking at changes in personal health, we test the theory in a new setting. Health, as we 
argue based on the reviewed literature, seems to have potential for a more concrete impact in 
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people’s political behaviour than life-cycle events such as (un)employment and human 
relationships. Being such a fundamental aspect of human existence, health could create strong 
enough incentives for people to reconsider their relationship with politics. Personal health 
seems particularly likely to bring about changes even in attitudes that are typically resistant to 
change, as suggested by findings from studies on healthcare policy attitudes and health effects 
on voting. Deteriorating health could make a person suddenly more dependent on public 
healthcare services, thus increasing their need to know what is going on in politics, in order to 
affect the relevant policy decisions1. We therefore assume that health has a mobilizing impact, 
because dependency on the surrounding society will lead to people perceiving politics as more 
salient to their daily lives as they are more likely to feel the concrete effects of policies. 
Rephrased as a hypothesis, we assume that the deterioration of personal health is associated 
with increased political interest (H1). We assume this relationship to hold even after 
controlling for several background variables, most notably age and education. Age and 
education are of particular importance, because the two are strongly linked with both health 
and interest. Due to natural reasons, health tends to deteriorate as a function of ageing, and 
education typically has a strong positive relationship with political interest. 
 
Previous research also suggests an elaboration of H1. While health problems can plausibly be 
expected to increase a person’s motivation to start paying more attention to politics, the effect 
is likely to be strongest among people who are more dependent on public services or income 
transfers. Those with good income have more options and are economically more independent 
of public health services. Thus, among these people, the effect of health problems is likely to 
have a weaker impact on interest, at least through the motivational mechanism that we are 
examining. Thus, we assume that the deterioration of health is more strongly associated with 
increased political interest among low-income than mid-range and high-income citizens (H2). 
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The second hypothesis therefore addresses a more rigorous test of the core idea that expressions 
of political interest could be understood through the maximization of personal (economic) gain, 
as proposed by the self-interest paradigm.  
 
Data 
Our data comes from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which observed the same 
individuals over 18 waves during the period stretching from 3 September 1991 to 9 April 2009. 
The original BHPS respondents have been included in the more recent UK Household 
Longitudinal Study (UKHLS). However, and unfortunately for our case, the formulation of the 
self-reported health question is different in the currently running UKHLS, which means that 
we are unable to use these observations in our analysis. 
 
The first BHPS wave included around 5,500 households containing 10,300 individuals living 
in Great Britain. In the data we are using, interest in politics is captured by the standard item 
How interested would you say you are in politics? The possible answers are ordered as: Not at 
all interested, Not very interested, Fairly interested and Very interested. Regrettably, there is 
no issue-specific question about interest in health care policy is available in the BHPS data. 
However, general political interest is commonly understood to reflect an overall estimation of 
how much a person pays attention to politics, including different, specific policy areas. 
 
Figure 1 shows the average levels of interest in politics stratified by wave in the BHPS data. 
There is no data available from waves seven to ten, because the question on political interest 
was not asked. The average scores seem rather stable, revolving around 2.28 (standard 
deviation: 0.91) with a high (2.49) in 1992 (second wave) and a low (2.19) in 2005 (16th wave). 
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However, the average values do not tell us anything about how stable interest levels have been 
for the individual respondents over time. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The effect of changes in health on political interest 
In sociological medicine, self-rated health has been measured by a single item in surveys since 
the 1950s. Two different wordings have been used: the simple assessment of one’s personal 
health status or, as in the BHPS, an evaluation of personal health as a comparison with same-
aged peers (Jylhä, 2009: 307): Please think back over the last 12 months about how your health 
has been. Compared to people of your own age, would you say that your health has on the 
whole been: Very poor, Poor, Fair, Good and Excellent. Such evaluations of self-rated health 
are considered to reliably condense a number of various health aspects and health-promoting 
behaviour into a personal assessment of one’s own health (for example, Fylkesnes and Forde, 
1992).  
 
Since political interest is not a one-off act (such as, for example, turning out to vote), and is 
measured several times over the BHPS study period, in our models we capture the effect of the 
lagged value of health on current political interest. By lagging health by one wave (year), the 
analysis allows for some time during which health can shape political interest, as we are mostly 
interested in chronic health conditions, which may have a gradual impact on interest. This may 
help to bypass part of the ‘noise’ or random fluctuations in political interest, capturing a more 
realistic variation of political interest along the time. Another good reason to employ the lagged 
value of health is presented by Pacheco and Fletcher (2015). According to the authors, self-
rated health status may not be independent of the outcomes we wish to use them to explain 
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(ibid.: 106). For example, individuals may justify their lack of interest in politics by referring 
to a “legitimate” reason such as health problems. Using the lagged value of health helps us to 
alleviate the potential endogeneity problem, which could lead to overestimated coefficient 
estimates. The reason that we do not use both current and lagged levels of health in the analysis, 
is that using both of them would cancel out the main impetus behind using lagged levels of 
health in the first place. Using even longer lags could also mitigate the potential endogeneity 
problem mentioned above but the trade-off is that we would use self-rated health of more than 
two years ago to predict current levels of political interest.       
 
Voters’ age is an important as it affects both health and political interest. Taking into account 
that the relationship between political interest and age is not linear2 (p<.000, F(3, 84685) =   
13.64) and that a cubic spline function usually behaves poorly in the tails (Harrell, 2001) we 
assume a natural spline also known as restricted cubic spline (RCS).  RCS is a function that is 
“a straight line before the first and after the last knot and continuous and smooth at the knot 
boundaries” (Dupont, 2009: 135). We follow Harrell (2001) who recommends placing five3 
knots at equally spaced percentiles. The first knot is placed at the 5th (Age=20), the second one 
at the 27.5th (Age=33), the third one at the 50th (Age=44), the fourth one at the 72.5th (Age=58) 
and the fifth one at the 95th percentile (Age=78).  
 
Below we discuss in detail two models that we use to analyse the relationship between health 
and interest. We start our analyses with a fixed effects model which we call static as it does not 
include the lagged value of the dependent variable as a regressor. The major advance of the 
fixed effects model is that it removes the potential effect of unobserved time-invariant variables 
from the analysis. Thus, it alleviates the problem of omitted variable bias. However, time-series 
of attitudes, such as interest, often are affected by measurement error (Prior, 2010). This is why 
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we also use a dynamic model where we let the previous values of interest to affect the current 
ones. 
 
Static model 
Our first model is a static linear fixed effects regression with a first-order autoregressive (AR1) 
disturbance term: 
POLINTER𝑖𝑡
= υ + δ(INCOME)𝑖𝑡
+ β(L1. HEALTH)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑓1[AGE𝑖𝑡]γ1+𝑓2[AGE𝑖𝑡]γ2+𝑓3[AGE𝑖𝑡]γ3+𝑓4[AGE𝑖𝑡]γ4+ζ(EDUC)𝑖𝑡+θ(MLSTAT)𝑖𝑡+λ(YEAR)𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖 + ε𝑖𝑡 
(Model 1) 
 
The disturbance term is a first order autoregressive ε𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌ε𝑖𝑡−1 + ω𝑖𝑡, (ω𝑖𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜔
2 )); 𝛼𝑖 
stands for the unit effect that accounts for unobserved time invariant characteristics; 
L1. HEALTH for the lagged value of health; υ for the intercept; INCOME for the monthly total 
income of the last month; letters γ1, … , γ4 are the estimates for the restricted cubic spline 
covariates  𝑓1[AGE𝑖𝑡], … , 𝑓4[AGE𝑖𝑡] respectively. For convenience, hereinafter, we refer to the 
restricted cubic spline covariates 𝑓1[AGE𝑖𝑡], 𝑓2[AGE𝑖𝑡], etc. as RC spline 1, RC spline 2, etc. 
respectively. The variable YEAR controls for the effect of time with year dummies and lastly 
EDUC and MLSTAT stand for education and marital status.   
 
To deal with the endogeneity resulting from the correlation between the omitted (time-
invariant) variables and the explanatory ones (Baltagi, 2008) we specify a fixed effect model 
(FE). The FE does not impose the strict assumption of the random effects model (RE) which is 
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that the unit effect is a random variable unrelated to all other exogenous regressors (Gelman 
and Hill, 2007). Assuming for example an initial model of the form 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏𝑥𝑖𝑡+𝛼𝑖 + ε𝑖𝑡, the 
FE estimation cancels out4 the unit effect by subtracting time averages yielding thus a within 
model such as 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 = 𝑏(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)+ (ε𝑖𝑡 − ε̅𝑖). In practical terms, this transformation means 
that both the dependent interest variable and the independent variables are de-meaned, meaning 
that they are measured as changes from the respondent’s average levels. Theoretically this 
means that we expect deviations from individuals’ long-time levels of health to be connected 
to changes in interest levels. 
 
 Dynamic model 
Drawing on the work by Prior (2010) we also consider a dynamic panel analysis. 
Our second model is dynamic, because it includes the dependent variable lagged by one and 
two5-time units:  
 
POLINTER𝑖𝑡
= υ + φ1(L1. POLINTER)𝑖𝑡 + φ2(L2. POLINTER)𝑖𝑡 + δ(INCOME)𝑖𝑡
+ β(L1. HEALTH)𝑖𝑡 + κ(L2. HEALTH)𝑖𝑡 + λ(L3. HEALTH)𝑖𝑡 + μ(L4. HEALTH)𝑖𝑡
+ ξ(HEALTH)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑓1[AGE𝑖𝑡]γ1+𝑓2[AGE𝑖𝑡]γ2+𝑓3[AGE𝑖𝑡]γ3+𝑓4[AGE𝑖𝑡]γ4+ζ(EDUC)𝑖𝑡+θ(MLSTAT)𝑖𝑡+λ(YEAR)𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖 + ε𝑖𝑡 
 (Model 2) 
 
Model 2 assesses the impact of our main independent variable (L1. HEALTH), controlling at 
the same time for the effect of longer lags of health, such as the second (L2. HEALTH), the third 
(L3. HEALTH) and the fourth lag (L4. HEALTH), as well as for contemporaneous health 
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condition (HEALTH) Furthermore Model 2 includes the first and second lag of the dependent 
variable (φ1 and φ2 are the estimates of L1. POLINTER and L2. POLINTER, respectively).  
Inclusion of the lagged dependent variables leads now to a new endogeneity problem because 
the lagged dependent variables are correlated with ε̅𝑖 since the average of the disturbances also 
contain the lagged values of the disturbances. We therefore resort to a generalized method of 
moments estimator such as the Arellano-Bond that employs instrumental variables to compute 
the estimates of a linear dynamic model. The Arellano-Bond estimator eliminates the unit effect 
through first differences. Assuming for simplicity a model without strictly exogenous variables 
and a value of 𝑦 lagged by one time unit, such as 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡−1+𝛼𝑖 + ε𝑖𝑡, the Arellano-Bond 
estimator eliminates 𝛼𝑖 by differencing: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑐( 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2)+ (ε𝑖𝑡 − ε𝑖𝑡−1) (1). 
Then the Arellano-Bond estimator constructs instruments employing values of the dependent 
variable lagged by two periods (or more) for which we want 𝐸(∆𝑦𝑖(𝑡−𝑗)∆ε𝑖𝑡)=0, 𝑗 ≥ 2 (*). So 
for example when 𝑡 = 3 in (1) we want 𝑦𝑖1 to be correlated with 𝑦𝑖2 − 𝑦𝑖1 and not with ε𝑖3 −
ε𝑖2. (We come to this point again when we discuss the results of autocorrelation tests). 
 
Column (1) of Table 1 presents results from the static fixed effects model. Although the FE 
specification cannot estimate the coefficients for time-invariant characteristics, such as gender, 
nevertheless the effects of such characteristics are controlled for by the fixed effects 
specification. Column (3) of Table 2 presents results from the dynamic model as estimated by 
the Arellano-Bond estimator.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
One important note should be in place regarding the FE estimator before moving to discuss the 
calculated estimates. In applications where the within variation is smaller in comparison to the 
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between variation6, the standard errors of the fixed effects coefficients may be too large to 
tolerate (Allison, 2009: 8). However, the standard errors reported in Table 1 show that this is 
not a problem. As Cameron and Trivedi (2010) note, a linear regression with AR1 errors is a 
better model than the i.i.d error model [...] and potentially will lead to more efficient parameter 
estimates (ibid: 227).  
 
In the fixed effects model the control variables behave as expected. The results show that 
educated individuals are more interested in politics than individuals with no qualifications. 
Also married respondents are more interested in politics than unmarried ones. On the other 
hand, total monthly income does not appear to have a statistically significant effect. Regarding 
age, the estimate of RC spline 1 is positive; the estimate of RC spline 2 is negative; the estimate 
of RC spline 3 is positive; and the estimate of RC spline 4 is negative. Since restricted cubic 
splines cannot be interpreted in the same way as linear ones, Figure 2a pictures the relationship 
between age and political interest keeping all other independent variables stable at their mean. 
Figure 2a depicts a curvilinear relationship where political interest increases until the age of 70 
and stabilizes thereinafter. Figure 2b shows the marginal effect of the restricted cubic spline. 
“In other words, it shows for each value of the spline variable how much the expected value of 
the explained variable changes for a unit change in the spline variable” (Buis, 2009). The rate 
at which political interest changes with respect to the change of age is the highest for 
individuals between 20 and 40 year old. For individuals above 75, the change of political 
interest with respect to the change of age remains quite stable.    
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
16 
 
Lastly, turning attention to our main independent variable,, the coefficient estimate for Health 
(L1) in the linear FE model is negative but not statistically significant. When income is 
removed from the set of controls, the negative estimate of Health (L1) becomes statistically 
significant with p<.05 (Static (2)). In other words, results indicate that as health improves 
(deteriorates), political interest decreases (increases), yet it should be noted that the effect is 
rather miniscule7.   
 
The results from the dynamic Arellano-Bond models are shown in Table 1 in columns 4. As 
Arellano and Bond (1991: 278) argue “an estimator that uses lags as instruments under the 
assumption of white noise errors would lose its consistency if in fact the errors were serially 
correlated. It is therefore essential to satisfy oneself that this is not the case by reporting test 
statistics of the validity of the instrumental variables (that is, tests of lack of serial correlation) 
together with the parameter estimates”. So, we first check whether our dynamic model is 
correctly specified. We test for autocorrelation employing the Arellano-Bond test for zero 
autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. Results show that our dynamic model has been 
specified correctly. As expected the z-statistic of the Arellano-Bond test is negative and 
significant for autocorrelation of order 1. Yet what matters is that we do not reject 
autocorrelation of order 2 (p=0.533), not even of order 3 (p=0.908), indicating thus that the 
Arellano-Bond model assumptions are satisfied. We also check whether the overidentifying 
restrictions of the model are valid. The Sargan test does not reject the null hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid with  χ2(68) = 73.89 and p=0.29. The p-value, 0.29, is 
non-significant (as that was the case also for the AR(2) and AR(3) tests), a result that make us 
believe that the analysis conducted employs valid instruments. 
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Under the dynamic model (column 3) the first and second lag of the dependent variable are, as 
expected, both highly significant and positive indicating that last years and last two years 
political interest affect current political interest “after accounting for a person’s long term 
interest […] and the effect of contemporary disturbances” (Prior, 2010: 758).  Age and marital 
status appear to be more or less unaffected by the inclusion of lagged dependent variables; the 
estimates of education, retain mostly their positive signs yet they lose their explanatory power 
owing to the inclusion of lagged dependent variables. Also, income does not affect the outcome 
nor does contemporaneous health condition. In contrast, the estimate of our main independent 
variable, the first lag of health, is negative and statistically significant8  with p<.01.  Similarly, 
coefficient estimates of longer lags of health are also all negative and statistically significant. 
Our confidence in the robustness of the afore-mentioned findings is further enhanced by Prior’s 
recent book (2019), which upon including two different types of health (physical and mental) 
in a dynamic model, also reports a negative effect of health on political interest.  
 
Next, we turn to our second hypothesis, according to which we expect that the effect that health 
deterioration leads to an increase in political interest should be more evident among people 
with lower income. To test the hypothesis, we compute the percentiles of the income variable 
for each wave separately because income does not remain stable but changes with time (for 
example, monthly income below the 10th percentile was £367 in 1991 while it was £542 in 
2009 etc.) The reason for working with percentiles is that we are not able to specify a priori 
where the lines between low, middle and high income are drawn. The mean and median give 
the central income trends for each quantile in the period 1991-2009. For example, the average 
(middling) monthly income below the 10th percentile in the period 1991-2009, was £442 
(£431); the average (middling) monthly income below the 90th percentile in the period 1991-
2009 was £2,423 (£2,325), etc. (see supplementary analyses, Appendix B). In the following 
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analysis, we use interactions to assess the effect of health on political interest for individuals 
belonging to different income percentiles. 
 
First, we add an interaction term in the static model. The reason to include interactions in the 
static model, although health appears not to significantly affect political interest when total 
monthly income is controlled for, is because the effect of health might nevertheless be 
significant for low income groups as we hypothesised. The interaction is between the mean 
income percentile and health condition (lagged) but identical results are obtained when one 
considers median values as the latter are very similar to the mean ones (see supplementary 
analyses in the Appendix B).  
 
Two different linear regressions are then specified: In the first regression (REG1) the analysis 
considers as low income group, individuals belonging below the 10th percentile; as high income 
group, individuals with income above the 90th percentile; and as middle income group, 
individuals with income between the 10th and the 90th percentile. The second regression 
(REG2) considers as individuals with low income those who fall below the 20th percentile and 
as individuals with high income those who are above the 80th percentile. Although the amounts 
corresponding to high monthly income in REG1 and REG2, 2423£ and 1836£ respectively, 
might not seem particularly large amounts in today’s standards, the one should bear in mind 
that our data goes as back as 1991. Figure 3 shows the average political interest for income 
groups of REG1 whereas figure 4 the average political interest for income groups of REG2.   
 
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
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The slopes shown in Figures 3 and 4 are based on estimates from REG1 and REG2 respectively 
(Table 3). The interaction estimates in column (1) show whether the slope of the lower income 
group in REG1 (bottom 10%) is statistically different than the slopes for the middle and upper 
income groups. The results show that interactions are not statistically significant which was to 
be expected only by gazing the slopes in Figure 1. However, the interaction estimates in column 
(2) are both positive and statistically significant. In other words, the static analysis supports our 
hypothesis that the effect of changes in health on changes in political interest has more sizeable 
effects for lower incomes (bottom 20%) compared to middle and upper incomes.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Column (3) and (4) of Table 2 repeat the interaction analyses, assuming this time dynamic 
models.9 Under REG1 in column (3) the dynamic analysis reports similar findings as the fixed 
effects analysis, namely that the effect of health on political interest does not differ among 
different income groups. Yet, results from a dynamic analysis of REG2 in column (4) show 
that the interaction for the middle income group is statistical significant meaning that the effect 
of changes in health is more pronounced for respondents with low income (bottom 20%) than 
in the middle income group. This implies that the non-significant estimate of health reported 
in the case of the dynamic model in Table 1, actually reflected the effect related to middle and 
top incomes (top 20%) supressing thus the effect related to low incomes (bottom 20%).  Also, 
the fact that there was no real difference in the effect of decline in health on political interest 
between the low and top incomes might be related to a ceiling effect: well-off people are 
already quite interested in politics and changes in health their conditions are less likely increase 
their interest than among those with low starting levels of interest. However, this effect is 
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probably limited as the average value for interest on the one to four scale is only 2.27 among 
the top 10% earners, leaving room for potential improvements. 
 
Conclusions 
Interest in politics is a key precursor of a citizen’s attitudes toward democratic politics. Yet, 
political science has not been able to fully reveal its nature, as scholars have offered opposing 
views and evidence concerning its stability during an individual’s life course. This is an 
important question for the study of political behaviour, because it determines whether or not 
we can examine political interest, and other fundamental attitudes, simply by looking at how 
they develop. 
 
Since political interest is most often employed as an independent variable in analyses of 
political behaviour, scholarship has not adequately addressed it as a theoretically important and 
interesting dependent variable. However, a better understanding of what lies behind citizens’ 
self-expressed political interest levels is essential. In this study, we have suggested that the 
concept of political interest implies motivation, which typically manifests itself through 
political engagement. Based on psychological theories, we have put forth the idea that perhaps 
the motivational nature of political interest should be seen as signifying self-interest. Since 
human actions are driven by the motivation to maximise personal gain, also political interest 
could be understood essentially as a function of self-interest in political matters. 
 
We have tested this idea by examining whether changes in motivation levels could cause 
instability in political interest. We argued that deteriorating health could plausibly constitute a 
strong enough question of self-interest to even destabilize the typically very stable subjective 
sense of interest in politics. We considered changes in personal health as a life event, as claimed 
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by life-cycle theory, and hypothesized a negative relationship between health and interest: we 
assumed that the deterioration of personal health is associated with increased political interest, 
because worsening health makes a person more dependent on public healthcare and therefore 
increases their incentives to pay attention to politics.  
 
We used both static and dynamic panel models to analyse the relationship between health and 
political interest. The results gave only partial support for our first hypothesis: results from our 
dynamic model show that a decline in health is associated with an increase in the interest in 
politics. However, results from the static panel model offer weaker support to the hypothesis, 
if at all. Furthermore, the effect size is rather small, showing that a decline in health leads only 
to a small increase in interest. These results, however, may be related to the differentiated effect 
of health in different income groups, a possibility examined by our second hypothesis. 
 
Our second hypothesis elaborated the health-interest relationship. We assumed that the effect 
of changes in health on interest would be conditional on the income level of the respondents. 
This is because people with low income are often dependent on public healthcare, whereas 
people with high income are not. Therefore, we expected to see a stronger effect of growing 
political interest among low-income individuals as a result of declining health. The evidence 
showed some support for the second hypothesis, as we only found the expected negative 
relationship between health and interest in the lower income group, but not in other income 
groups.  
 
On the whole, our analysis gives some support to the general idea that attitudes could be open 
to change even after the formative years, as we have identified a context where political interest 
fluctuates at the individual level as a result of a significant change in life circumstances. This 
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observation lends some, although not overwhelming, support for the life-cycle theory, which 
presumes that important events during the life course have consequences even for the most 
endurable political attitudes. The magnitude of changes in interest produced by health 
differences should not be overdramatized, but it seems that deteriorating personal health is 
demonstrably a strong enough source of motivation to make a person more interested in 
politics. Additionally, the relationship is contingent on the level of income. We therefore 
conclude that it seems that even the most fundamental of political attitudes, including political 
interest, can change over time. 
 
We have reached this conclusion by arguing for a self-interest-centred view of political interest. 
More evidence from different contexts is, however, needed before we can feel confident that 
the political interest is sensitive to self-interest considerations and that the life-cycle theory can 
reliably predict fluctuations in political interest. Our analysis nevertheless suggests that for life-
cycle theory to be useful for analysing changes in relatively stable attitudes, life events should 
be more dramatic – and perhaps sudden – than events such as the gradual transition to adulthood 
through acquiring a job and a family, something that typically takes several years. Moreover, 
political contexts are likely to affect the impact of health on political interest. The UK, where 
our data comes from, is a case where policy choices can plausibly be expected to have an 
impact on healthcare services. In countries with a more privatized healthcare sector people may 
not be equally likely to become politically interested due to changes in health, if they do not 
expect the political system to be able to affect health policy. Consequently, in addition to testing 
the robustness of our findings in other life event contexts, they should also be tested in different 
national contexts. 
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End notes 
1 According to the Ipsos Mori and Economist Issues Index 
(https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/2017-06/Issues%20Index_May2017.pdf), the National 
health system in Britain has been “the most important issue facing Britain today” from 1997 to 2005 
(almost without any interruptions) and in comparison to issues as important as unemployment, crime, 
economy, immigration etc.   
2 See Model 1 that follows: We test γ2 = γ3 = γ4 = 0. 
3 Fewer knots only make sense for very small samples, for example when n<100 (Harrell, 2001; 
Dupont, 2009). 
4 Another way to do this would be through a first difference model.  
5 The reason to lag the dependent variable also by two units is mainly because if one does not 
consider the second lag of the dependent variable in the analysis, results from both the Arellano-Bond 
and Skagan test worsen off (See the discussion that follows under Table 1).   
6 See Web appendix A. 
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.  
8 We also checked whether health has a different effect on political interest depending on the year 
(panel) being studied, but the results do not show any significant differences. 
9 The Dynamic model in Table 2 differs from that of Table 1 as it only includes the first lag of the 
health variable. This is because we want to test if the effect of our main independent variable - the 
first lag of health - on political interest varies among income groups. Since the analysis in Table 1 
already showed that the first lag of health had a statistically significant effect on political interest also 
when controlling for contemporaneous and longer lags of health, we decided to only to interact the 
first lag of health with income in Table 2.    
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WEBAPPENDIX:  
Appendix A 
 
Table A presents the overall, between and within panel variation for the variables employed in 
the analysis.  
 
Table A. Overall, between and within panel variation  
Variable Variation: Standard deviation 
Interest in politics Overall  
Between 
Within 
.908 
.814 
.488 
Health Condition Lagged Overall 
Between 
Within 
.941 
.802 
.600 
RC spline1 Overall 
Between 
Within 
17.739 
18.966 
3.858 
RC spline2 Overall 
Between 
Within 
16.531 
16.637 
3.953 
RC spline3 Overall 
Between 
Within 
7.074 
7.077 
2.481 
RC spline4 Overall 
Between 
Within 
2.481 
0.703 
.720 
Education  Overall 
Between 
Within 
1.715 
1.680 
.276 
Marital Status Overall 
Between 
Within 
.496 
.468 
.213 
Year Panel Overall 
Between 
Within 
4.949 
4.285 
3.837 
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Appendix B 
Table B presents the monthly income percentiles per wave as well as mean and median scores. 
Figures are in pounds and rounded. Salaries range from 300£/month to 72177£/month. 
 
Table B: Income per wave and mean and median income scores.  
Waves 
 w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
18waves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Median 
18 waves 
10% 367 378 379 380 387 398 398 407 423 
 
20% 441 459 467 466 485 503 505 521 542 
30% 542 563 580 576 608 632 626 650 664 
40% 656 681 699 701 750 763 757 792 805 
50% 786 814 835 841 900 922 918 951 967 
60% 932 975 993 1010 1082 1103 1106 1136 1147 
70% 1113 1154 1205 1213 1306 1338 1338 1371 1388 
80% 1383 1441 1500 1506 1604 1671 1649 1705 1733 
90% 1783 1900 1955 2002 2088 2191 2206 2285 2277 
 
 w10 w11 w12 w13 w14 w15 w16 w17 w18 
10% 440 447 467 478 498 509 524 528 542 442 431 
20% 575 585 617 639 662 675 705 720 745 573 559 
30% 711 724 763 800 823 841 880 901 932 712 688 
40% 859 876 929 965 1000 1026 1058 1095 1114 862 832 
50% 1028 1056 1116 1143 1184 1222 1272 1303 1324 1032 998 
60% 1226 1251 1336 1356 1397 1436 1507 1555 1601 1231 1186 
70% 1477 1512 1622 1646 1668 1741 1803 1851 1917 1481 1433 
80% 1801 1853 2008 2040 2083 2167 2226 2302 2368 1836 1767 
90% 2364 2470 2620 2708 2768 2825 2952 3068 3152 2423 2325 
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Table 1: The effect of health on political interest: Static and dynamic panel analysis 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
Interest in politics 
Static Dynamic 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Political interest 
(L1) 
- - .093***    
(.016) 
Political interest 
(L2) 
- - .039***    
(.010) 
Total monthly 
income× 10−5 
-.038    
.231 
- .100    
.364 
Health (L1) -.004    
(.003) 
-.005*     
(.002) 
-.068**     
(.025) 
Longer Lags: 
 
Health (L2) 
 
 
Health (L3) 
 
 
Health (L4) 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
-.032**    
(.012) 
 
-.028**     
(.008) 
 
-.014*    
(.007) 
Contemporaneous 
Health 
- - .092    
(.099) 
Age: 
 
RC spline 1 
 
 
RC spline 2 
 
 
RC spline 3 
 
 
RC spline 4 
 
 
 
.022***    
(.003) 
 
-.075***    
(.014) 
 
.220***    
(.040) 
 
-.216***    
(.041) 
 
 
.019***    
(.003) 
 
-.082***     
(.011) 
 
.242***     
(.034) 
 
-.236***      
(.035) 
 
 
.044**    
(.017) 
 
-.113*    
(.048) 
 
.333*    
(.144) 
 
-.335*    
(.150) 
Education: 
(Reference group: 
‘No qualification’) 
 
Degree† 
 
 
Diploma 
 
 
 
 
 
.213***    
(.045) 
 
.145**   
(.051) 
 
 
 
 
.145***    
(.040) 
 
.078    
(.046) 
 
 
 
 
.031    
(.147) 
 
.110    
(.174) 
 
.183    
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A Level 
 
 
O Level 
 
 
CSE 
 
.180***    
(.042) 
 
.087*    
(.041) 
 
.150*    
(.073) 
.133***   
(.038) 
 
.068    
(.038) 
 
.106    
(.064) 
(.149) 
 
-.020    
(.139) 
 
.393*    
(.185) 
Marital status: 
(Reference group: 
‘Unmarried’) 
Married 
 
 
.050***    
(.010) 
 
.047***   
(.009) 
 
.056*    
(.022) 
Year (Dummies) Yes Yes Yes 
Allerano-Bond test 
Order: 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
z=-31.871 
(p=0.0000) 
z=.623 
(p= 0.533) 
z=-.115 
(p= 0.908) 
 
Skagan test  
- 
 
- 
chi2(68)= 
73.887 
(p= 0.292) 
Number of 
instruments 
- - 92 
Estimated random-
intercept (SD) 
.768 .771 - 
Estimated residual 
(SD) 
.522 .523 - 
Fraction of variance 
due to individual 
effect 
.684 .685 - 
N 102,413 122,695 39,332 
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Table 2. REG1 and REG2 for static and dynamic panel analysis 
 Static analysis Dynamic analysis 
Dependent variable: Interest in 
politics 
REG1 
(1) 
REG2 
(2) 
REG1 
(3) 
REG2 
(4) 
Political interest (L1) 
 
- 
 
- 
.082*** 
(.012) 
.082*** 
(.012) 
Political interest (L2) 
 
- 
 
- 
.037*** 
(.008) 
.037*** 
(.008) 
Health (L1) -.007 
(.008) 
-.018** 
(.006) 
-.014 
(.011) 
-.020* 
(.009) 
Income: (Reference group: Lower 
10% income) 
 
Between lower and upper 10% 
income 
 
Upper 10% income 
 
 
 
-.016 
(.029) 
 
-.018 
(.041) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.027 
(.044) 
 
-.040 
(.060) 
 
 
 
 
 
Interactions: 
 
Between lower and upper 10% 
income*health (L1)  
 
Upper 10% income*health (L1) 
 
 
 
.004 
(.008) 
 
.005 
(.010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.009 
(.011) 
 
.015 
(.015) 
 
 
 
Income: (Reference group: Lower 
20% income) 
 
Between lower and upper 20% 
income 
 
Upper 20% income 
  
 
 
-.071** 
(.022) 
 
-.078* 
(.030) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.060 
(.034) 
 
-.074 
(.045) 
Interactions:  
 
Between lower and upper 20% 
income*health (L1)  
 
Upper 20% income*health (L1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.017** 
(.006) 
 
.017* 
(.008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.018* 
(.009) 
 
.019 
(.011) 
Age (RC splines) 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marital status: 
Married 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year (Dummies) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Allerano-Bond test  
Order: 
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1 
 
2 
 
3 
- - z=-46.042 
(p=0.000) 
z=-.567 
(p=0.571) 
z=.403 
(p=0.687) 
z=-46.022  
(p=0.000) 
z=-.559  
(p=0.576) 
z=.388 
(p=0.698) 
Skagan test  - - chi2(14)=1
4.222 
(p=0.433) 
chi2(14)=1
4.331 
(p= 0.425) 
Number of instruments - - 40 40 
Estimated random-intercept (SD) .77 .77 - - 
Estimated residual (SD) .52 .52 - - 
Fraction of variance due to 
individual effect  
.68 .68 - - 
N 102,413 102,413 62,841 62,841 
Note: Parenthesized entries are standard errors; ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. The Allerano Bond models specify 
a two-step estimator with maximum two lags of the dependent variable that can be used as instruments.  
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Figure 1. Interest in politics by wave (BHPS) 
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Figure 2a and Figure 2b: The relationship between political interest and age (Figure 2a) 
and change of political interest with respect to change of age (Figure 2b) 
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        Figure 3. Margins with 95% CIs (REG1)
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        Figure 4. Margins with 95% CIs (REG2) 
          
 
 
